Hurricanes, Fraud, and Insurance: The Supreme Court Weighs In on, but Does Not Wade Into, the Concurrent Causation Conundrum in \u3ci\u3eState Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Rigsby\u3c/i\u3e by French, Christopher C.
 
(99) 
ESSAY 
HURRICANES, FRAUD, AND INSURANCE:  
THE SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN ON, BUT DOES  
NOT WADE INTO, THE CONCURRENT CAUSATION 
CONUNDRUM IN STATE FARM FIRE AND  
CASUALTY COMPANY V. RIGSBY 
CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH† 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine being a homeowner and leaving your coastal home in compliance 
with a hurricane evacuation order. Upon returning home, you find your home 
is gone. All that remains is the foundation slab.1 You, however, are one of the 
lucky few homeowners who has both homeowners insurance and flood 
insurance.2 Yet, when you tender a claim for the loss of your home to your 
insurers, both deny coverage. The homeowners insurer contends flooding—the 
storm surge—destroyed your home, while the flood insurer contends the 
home was blown away by the hurricane winds. The insurers’ positions leave 
you homeless and without an insurer willing to pay for your lost home, even 
though you have insurance for both wind and flood losses. 
 
† Visiting Assistant Professor, Penn State Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., 
Columbia University. 
1 See, e.g., Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 523 F.3d 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(recounting the story of homeowners who returned home after evacuating for a hurricane only to 
find their homes “completely destroyed”). 
2 Many homeowners in flood prone areas do not have flood insurance. In fact, only about ten 
percent of Hurricane Katrina victims had flood insurance, while approximately fifty percent of the 
victims of Super Storm Sandy had flood insurance. Christopher C. French, Insuring Floods: The Most 
Common and Devastating Natural Catastrophes in America, 60 VILL. L. REV. 53, 53 (2015) [hereinafter 
French, Insuring Floods]. Approximately seven percent of homeowners nationwide have flood 
insurance. Id. at 54. 
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This relatively common situation can be described as the concurrent 
causation conundrum.3 Standard form homeowners insurance policies 
exclude coverage for flood damage but provide coverage for wind damage.4 
Flood insurance, which is sold and administered by private insurers but 
financially backed by the federal government, on the other hand, covers flood 
damage but not wind damage.5 When certain natural catastrophes occur, such 
as hurricanes, it is often unclear whether the resulting damage was inflicted 
by the concurrent causes of wind or water because the damage is so extensive 
and occurs in a short period of time with few or no eyewitnesses. Concurrent 
causation situations create a problem for the homeowner, who has the burden 
of proving that the claim is covered under the basic insuring agreement.6 It 
also creates a conflict of interest for the homeowners insurer if the homeowners 
insurance policy is issued by the same insurer that is administering the flood 
insurance policy on behalf of the federal government, which commonly is the 
case.7 To minimize its claims payments and thereby increase its profitability, 
the homeowners insurer has a financial incentive to claim that most, if not all, 
of a concurrently caused loss is due to water.8 Doing so ensures that the 
federal government, instead of the homeowner insurer, will pay for the loss.9 
 
3 Numerous articles have been written about the concurrent causation conundrum since 
Hurricane Katrina. See, e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for 
Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957, 962-68 (2010) (discussing how concurrent causation 
complicates insurance coverage); Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient Proximate Cause, the Katrina 
Disaster, Prosser’s Folly, and the Third Restatement of Torts: Cracking the Conundrum, 54 LOY. L. REV. 1, 
15 (2008) (explaining how the way in which a concurrent causation problem is resolved can determine 
whether insurance covers a loss). The author of this Essay is, however, the first person to propose 
the following solutions to the problem discussed in this Essay. 
4 See French, Insuring Floods, supra note 2, at 76-77 (explaining that homeowners insurance 
typically covers wind damage but not flood damage); see also KENNETH ABRAHAM & DANIEL 
SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 197-98 (6th ed. 2015) (reprinting the flood 
exclusion currently contained in many standard form homeowners insurance policies). 
5 French, Insuring Floods, supra note 2, at 66. Very few private insurers are willing to cover flood 
losses, so the federal government created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968 to 
sell flood insurance. See id. (discussing the federal government’s NFIP). 
6 See, e.g., Lunday v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 696, 699 (Miss. 1973) (“The trial judge 
correctly instructed the jury that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to prove that the damages 
sustained were covered by the peril insured against, that is, by direct action of the wind.”). 
7 See French, Insuring Floods, supra note 2, at 66, 76 n.129 (explaining how private insurance 
companies administer the NFIP policies on behalf of the federal government). 
8 For a discussion of how the profit imperative has undermined the risk transferring function 
of insurance, see generally Christopher C. French, The Role of the Profit Imperative in Risk 
Management, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081 (2015). 
9 A significant amount of flood insurance losses are actually paid by taxpayers because the 
NFIP has been insolvent for many years. See French, Insuring Floods, supra note 2, at 69 (“[T]he 
NFIP was insolvent with a deficit of $24 billion as of December 2013.”). Thus, some of the flood loss 
claims must be paid with taxpayer dollars. 
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On December 6, 2016, the United States Supreme Court decided a case 
in which the concurrent causation conundrum was center stage: State Farm 
Fire and Casualty Company v. United States ex rel. Rigsby.10 There, Hurricane 
Katrina damaged a homeowner’s house.11 The homeowner had homeowners 
insurance with State Farm and a flood insurance policy administered by State 
Farm on behalf of the federal government.12 The claims adjusters assigned by 
State Farm to handle the homeowner’s claim were allegedly instructed by 
State Farm “to misclassify wind damage as flood damage in order to shift 
[State Farm’s own] liability to the [federal] [g]overnment.”13 
The claims handlers filed a lawsuit against State Farm under the False 
Claims Act (FCA),14 which imposes civil liability on any entity who 
“knowingly presents . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” 
to the federal government.15 A jury entered a verdict against State Farm in 
the amount of almost $3.7 million, which included a treble damages award 
and attorneys’ fees.16 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the 
case should have been dismissed because the claimants violated the FCA by 
revealing to the media the existence of the complaint against State Farm 
while the complaint was still under seal.17 Ultimately, a unanimous Supreme 
Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to dismiss the action.18 It reached this decision, in part, because the 
primary purpose of the requirement that FCA complaints be filed under seal 
is to protect the confidentiality of federal government investigations 
regarding a defendant’s conduct, not the interests of the defendant itself.19 
The violation of the seal did not prejudice the federal government’s 
 
10 137 S. Ct. 436 (2016). This is not the first time that State Farm’s claims handling practices 
have been at issue before the Supreme Court. One of the Court’s landmark decisions in the area of 
punitive damages, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 414-15 
(2003), involved allegations that State Farm acted in bad faith in its handling of an auto insurance 
claim in accordance with a corporate policy of underpaying claims to maximize State Farm’s profits 
at the expense of its policyholders. See JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY 
INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 64, 97, 106-09, 
138-40, 145, 158, 163 (2010) (describing the claims payment practices of State Farm and concluding 
that it does not act “like a good neighbor” when it comes to paying claims). 
11 Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. at 441. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
16 United States ex rel. Rigsby v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 794 F.3d 457, 465 (5th Cir. 2015), 
aff ’d, 137 S. Ct. 436 (2016). 
17 Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. at 439-40. 
18 Id. at 444. 
19 See id. at 443 (“[T]he seal requirement was intended in main to protect the Government’s interests.”). 
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investigation in the case because the government had decided not to join the 
lawsuit against State Farm, and it was not seeking any relief as a result of the leak.20 
The case will likely be remembered for the Supreme Court’s consideration 
of the purpose of the requirement for filing FCA complaints under seal, and 
the Court’s further discussion of whether dismissal of a complaint is an 
appropriate sanction when a claimant leaks information about that complaint. 
But the case should also be remembered for turning the spotlight on the concurrent 
causation conundrum associated with certain insurance claims—particularly 
hurricane claims where both water and wind cause the losses. Although the 
Supreme Court did not resolve the concurrent causation conundrum in 
Rigsby, is there a solution to it? 
Yes, two potential solutions come to mind: (1) eliminate the flood 
exclusion in homeowners insurance policies; or (2) broadly apply the “ensuing 
loss” exception to exclusions such as the flood exclusion. This Essay 
summarizes both options. 
I. ELIMINATION OF THE FLOOD EXCLUSION IN  
HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE POLICIES 
If “all risk” homeowners policies, which purport to cover all risks of loss 
except those risks specifically excluded,21 did not contain flood exclusions, 
then concurrent causation would not be a problem in the situation where it 
most commonly arises—wind damage versus water damage in hurricane cases. 
Since the 1960s, insurers almost uniformly have refused to insure flood 
losses despite selling “all risk” homeowners property policies.22 Thus, insurers 
created the concurrent causation conundrum by inserting flood exclusions 
into standard form homeowners insurance policies.23 
The primary theoretical justification for excluding flood losses from 
coverage—the correlated risk problem, which insurers have traditionally used 
to justify the exclusion—is not valid today. Correlated risks are risks that 
result in numerous significant losses in the same geographic area at 
 
20 Id. at 441. 
21 See Christopher C. French, The “Ensuing Loss” Clause in Insurance Policies: The Forgotten and 
Misunderstood Antidote to Anti-Concurrent Causation Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J. 215, 222 (2012) 
[hereinafter French, Ensuing Loss] (“‘All risk’ property and homeowners policies typically contain 
broad insuring language that is the same as or similar to the following: ‘This policy insures against 
all risks of direct physical loss or damage to property insured . . . except as excluded.’”). 
22 See Warren Kriesel & Craig Landry, Participation in the National Flood Insurance Program: An 
Empirical Analysis for Coastal Properties, 71 J. RISK & INS. 405, 405 (2004) (“The National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP) was initiated . . . in response to high annual disbursements of disaster 
relief payments and the failure of the private market to provide flood insurance.”). 
23 ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 4, at 197-98. 
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approximately the same time, as is the case with floods.24 According to 
insurers, the frequency, severity, and location of correlated risks cannot be 
accurately predicted, potentially resulting in catastrophic insurer losses for 
which actuarially sound premiums cannot be calculated and charged in 
advance.25 Thus, insurers exclude correlated risks from coverage if they are 
permitted to do so. But unlike sixty years ago, when insurance companies 
were local businesses that sold insurance in narrow geographic areas, many 
insurance companies today are global entities that sell insurance throughout 
the world.26 Consequently, the fear of catastrophic insurer losses from a major 
event like a flood is not as great today. The losses associated with flooding in 
New Orleans, for example, are not correlated to the risk of flood losses in 
New York City. 
In addition, the risk profiles of policyholders covered by homeowners 
insurance today are much more diverse and uncorrelated than they were sixty 
years ago. Ninety-six percent of the sixty-nine million homeowners in 
America buy homeowners insurance because one cannot get a federally 
guaranteed mortgage, which most are, without homeowners insurance.27 
Consequently, if flood losses were covered by homeowners insurance, then 
the risk of a flooding event causing an enormous drain on insurers’ capital 
reserves would be minimal. Specifically, the capital reserves would be 
generated by the premiums of sixty-nine million homeowners with diverse 
risk profiles instead of the much more limited pool of premiums currently 
being generated by the 5.5 million homeowners who are insured under the 
NFIP and primarily live in known flood areas.28 The risks of losses under the 
NFIP are much more correlated than they would be if floods were covered 
under homeowners insurance. 
 
24 See Véronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias Heldt, Insurance Against Catastrophe: 
Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y. F. 
185, 187 (2012) (describing how correlated risks like natural catastrophes “pose a number of challenges 
for insurers,” including “very large losses”); Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental 
and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 10-11 (2006) (“Losses due to flood, 
earthquake, or windstorm . . . tend to be highly correlated within geographic areas. That is, if A’s 
house is lost to flood, it is extremely likely that B’s house, located nearby, has been exposed to the 
same forces.”). 
25 See Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 24, at 187 (“Pricing catastrophe insurance 
products is complicated by a number of factors, including the difficulty of predicting the frequency 
and probability of catastrophic accidents and their related losses (although some catastrophe-modeling 
firms have made such calculations the core of their business). Spreading the risk of catastrophe losses 
over a sufficiently large base of buyers is also difficult and makes it harder for insurers to offer affordable 
products.” (footnote omitted)); French, Insuring Floods, supra note 2, at 63 (“Insurers do not want to 
insure correlated risks of loss because they do not believe they can accurately predict [them] . . . .”). 
26 French, Insuring Floods, supra note 2, at 64. 
27 Id. at 75. 
28 Id. 
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Finally, through global reinsurance29 and catastrophe bonds,30 the 
financial impact of flood events on individual insurers is further reduced. 
Under both of these risk-transferring mechanisms, an individual insurer’s 
losses are spread to other insurers and investors. Thus, the financial burden 
of individual loss events, such as floods, is spread farther across the capital 
markets today and each event has a lower impact on each individual insurer. 
In sum, the historical and theoretical justifications for excluding coverage 
for flood losses under “all risk” homeowners insurance policies are no longer 
sound. It is possible to require homeowners insurance to cover flood losses, 
and doing so would be one way to eliminate the concurrent causation 
conundrum in the situation where it arises most commonly. 
II. BROAD APPLICATION OF “ENSUING LOSS” CLAUSES 
“All risk” property policies cover all risks of loss unless a particular risk or 
peril is excluded.31 To avoid covering all risks of loss, insurers have added 
numerous exclusions to such policies, including exclusions that are known as 
“anti-concurrent causation” exclusions.32 Anti-concurrent causation exclusions 
purport to eliminate coverage when both an excluded peril and a covered peril 
cause a loss. Many policies with anti-concurrent causation exclusions also 
contain, however, a little known exception to such exclusions called an 
“ensuing loss” clause.33 
Ensuing loss clauses are poorly understood exceptions to exclusions 
contained in property policies, such as homeowners insurance policies. One 
example of an ensuing loss clause provides, “We insure for all risks of physical 
loss to the property described in Coverage A except for loss caused by [any 
of the six following excluded perils] . . . . Any ensuing loss from items 1 
through 6 not excluded is covered.”34 The term “ensuing loss” is not defined 
in the policies. It commonly is understood, however, to mean “[t]o take place 
after or as a result.”35 Thus, in essence, an ensuing loss clause reinstates 
 
29 Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 24, at 187-88 (noting that “the traditional insurance 
sector will increasingly have to rely upon the reinsurance (i.e. insurance for insurance companies) 
market to recompense catastrophic damages to the victims”). 
30 See French, Insuring Floods, supra note 2, at 75 (suggesting that the availability of catastrophe 
bonds cuts against concerns of insurer insolvency). 
31 See supra note 21 & accompanying text. 
32 See French, Ensuing Loss, supra note 21, at 217 (noting that property policies often contain an 
anti-concurrent causation exclusion). 
33 See id. (“Today, the ensuing loss clause is found in various types of property policies such as 
‘all risk’ and homeowners policies that also contain anti-concurrent causation exclusions.”). 
34 Roberts v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 705 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Ariz. 1985) (emphasis omitted). 
35 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 594 (5th ed. 2011). 
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coverage for an otherwise excluded loss where the loss results after a covered 
peril occurs—even if an excluded peril is also part of the causation chain. 
Ensuing loss clauses can play an important role in resolving concurrent 
causation claims, such as hurricane losses where both wind and water cause 
damage to property. Because ensuing loss clauses can be read to conflict with 
anti-concurrent causation exclusions, the rules of policy interpretation—contra 
proferentum36 and the reasonable expectations doctrine37—dictate that they be 
construed broadly in favor of reinstating coverage. 
The problem with ensuing loss clauses, however, is that courts have 
struggled to understand them and many courts have attempted to apply tort 
causation principles, such as “proximate cause” and “intervening and 
superseding” causation, to the clauses.38 This is a mistake because ensuing 
loss clauses are contractual provisions that should be interpreted according to 
the rules of insurance policy interpretation, which dictate that any 
ambiguities in such clauses be interpreted in favor of coverage—not pursuant 
to tort principles in which a factfinder is asked to determine which cause of a 
loss was the “first” cause or the “dominant” cause in the causation chain or 
whether a covered peril is an “intervening and superseding” cause.39 
In many situations, it is a legal fiction to pretend there is a single cause of 
a loss or that multiple causes of a loss can be unbundled in a reasoned manner. 
Indeed, even Michael Bragg, assistant counsel for State Farm, agrees with 
this point: 
 
36 See High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 476 (N.H. 1994) (“If the language 
of the policy reasonably may be interpreted more than one way and one interpretation favors 
coverage, an ambiguity exists in the policy that will be construed in favor of the insured and against 
the insurer.”); Salem Grp. v. Oliver, 607 A.2d 138, 139 (N.J. 1992) (“When a policy fairly supports 
an interpretation favorable to both the insured and the insurer, the policy should be interpreted in 
favor of the insured.”); Bonner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 841 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1992) (“The court must adopt the construction of an exclusionary clause urged by the insured as 
long as that construction is not unreasonable, even if the construction urged by the insurer appears 
to be more reasonable or a more accurate reflection of the parties’ intent.”); see also French, Ensuing 
Loss, supra note 21, at 222-25 (explaining that under the rule of contra proferentem, insurance policy 
ambiguities should be construed against the insurance company drafters). 
37 See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990) (holding that 
ambiguous coverage clauses in insurance policies are to be interpreted broadly to protect the 
objectively reasonable expectations of the insured); Roland v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 462 
S.E.2d 623, 625 (Ga. 1995) (“A contract of insurance should be strictly construed against the insurer 
and read in favor of coverage in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.”); see 
also French, Ensuing Loss, supra note 21, at 225 (noting that it is a “staple of insurance policy 
interpretation law . . . that a policy should be interpreted to fulfill the ‘reasonable expectations’ of 
the policyholder”). 
38 See French, Ensuing Loss, supra note 21, at 228-34 (explaining how courts have applied these 
tort causation principles when they interpret insurance policies). 
39 For a more detailed critique, see id. at 239-54. 
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[E]very event has an infinite number of causes; and second, each cause can 
be described in an infinite variety of ways. Although these statements are 
beyond serious philosophic challenge, they seem far removed from the 
practical considerations faced daily by policy drafters, underwriters, and 
claims persons. The demanding careers of such professionals leave little time 
to ponder Aristotle’s or Bacon’s notion of causation . . . . 
Property insurance, unlike liability insurance, is unconcerned with 
establishing negligence or otherwise assessing tort liability. Thus, we discover 
that “proximate cause has a different meaning in insurance cases than it has 
in tort cases. In tort cases the rules of proximate cause are applied for the 
single purpose of fixing culpability, and for that reason the rules reach back 
of both the injury and the physical cause to fix the blame on those who created 
the situation in which the physical laws of nature operated; in insurance cases 
the concern is not with the question of culpability or why the injury occurred, 
but only with the nature of the injury and how it happened.” . . . 
Thus, the “cause” of loss in the context of a property insurance contract 
is totally different from that in a liability policy. This distinction is critical to 
the resolution of losses involving multiple causes.40 
In short, ensuing loss clauses, which are contractual provisions drafted by 
insurers and contained in standard form property policies such as 
homeowners insurance,41 cut a path through the brambles of tort causation 
when read according to the rules of insurance policy interpretation. If they 
are broadly interpreted and applied, ensuing loss clauses could resolve the 
concurrent causation conundrum in many situations. 
III. CONCLUSION 
State Farm v. Rigsby likely will be remembered as an FCA case in which 
the Supreme Court simply held that the disclosure of information contained 
in complaints required to be filed under seal does not mandate dismissal. 
However, the case also shines a spotlight on the concurrent causation 
conundrum. The case did not provide the Supreme Court with a meaningful 
opportunity to provide any guidance regarding how to resolve the problem, 
but there are at least two ways the problem could be solved. First, removing 
the flood exclusion from property policies would eliminate one of the largest 
 
40 Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: New Perils for Property 
Insurers, 20 FORUM 385, 385-87 (1985) (alterations omitted) (quoting 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 463 
(2d ed. 1982)). 
41 See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1153 (1990) (“[P]roperty owner’s 
[sic] liability insurance contracts are standardized across insurers in a form few insureds have the 
power or experience to bargain around.”). 
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and most common situations—hurricane claims—where the concurrent 
causation problem currently exists. Second, broadly applying the ensuing loss 
clause in other contexts where concurrent causation problems arise would 
resolve the problem in many cases. 
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